Soestdijk Palace, December 1965

Dear Mr. Harris,

I have the honour to invite you to the next Bilderberg Meeting which will be held at the Hotel “Nassauer Hof” at Wiesbaden in Germany on 25, 26 and 27 March 1966.

You will find the agenda for this conference at the inside.

R.S.V.P. Bilderberg Meetings
1 Smidswater, The Hague

Prime of the Netherlands
AGENDA

I. Should NATO be reorganized and if so how?

II. The future of world economic relations especially between industrial and developing countries.
Agenda Item I

SHOULD NATO BE REORGANIZED, AND IF SO, HOW?

by Robert R. Bowie

The question of how the Atlantic Alliance should be organized can only be answered in terms of (1) its purposes; and (2) the relations among its members. Both are affected by the world situation and its appraisal.

From the start, the Alliance has combined two aims. The primary purpose in 1949 was to counter the direct Soviet threat to a prostrate Europe by a regional defense assuring the United States guarantee. But along with other actions taken in 1947-1950--including the Marshall Plan and the Schuman Plan--the Alliance also reflected a wider purpose.

Together these measures projected a long-term course (a) to construct firm bonds of many kinds between the United States and Europe; (b) to build a strong, unified Europe by gradual stages; and (c) to counter the Communist threat and work toward a stable world order.

Not all members shared all these aims at all times or gave them the same priority. Yet over the ensuing years, these have been major guideposts for Atlantic policy, marking its direction in spite of many detours and roadblocks. And the progress achieved, despite the setbacks, has been a decisive factor in transforming the situation in Western Europe, the Atlantic area, and the Communist world.
This process of rapid change has inevitably affected the relations of the allies among themselves and their attitudes toward the Alliance and its functions. One consequence has been a growing debate on how to adjust the Alliance to new conditions and a steady stream of proposals for reform.

No short paper could hope to catalogue or analyze this rich repertoire of commentary and ideas. Instead, the aim has been to choose for discussion a few key issues. What follows outlines (1) the changed conditions facing the Alliance; (2) how they have affected the need for joint action and the relations of the allies; and (3) selected proposals for improving Alliance operations.

I. The Conditions Now Facing the Alliance

The factors of change, which have affected both the challenges to the Alliance and the relations among its members, are familiar and can be briefly summarized.

1. Soviet Threat to Europe

The Soviet military threat is largely discounted in Europe despite the steady growth in Soviet military power. Underlying this sense of security is the confidence that a nuclear balance, to which NATO contributes, has created a reliable equilibrium. That conviction was reinforced by the outcome of the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Also encouraging Soviet restraint are its serious domestic problems (lower growth rates, planning difficulties, stagnation in agriculture, and shifts in organization and top leadership) and the weakening of Communist cohesion (Sino-Soviet conflict, East European pressure for more autonomy, greater independence of the Communist parties in Western Europe, and Sino-Soviet competition in parties elsewhere).
The U.S.S.R. has been seeking to adapt its strategy and tactics to these complexities. Its policy of coexistence appears to reflect both its desire to avoid risks of nuclear war and its recognition that a resurgent Europe offers poorer prospects for success than the less developed nations. In general, its policy toward the Atlantic world has been to cultivate an atmosphere of lower tension while making no concessions of substance and exploiting disruptive tendencies among the Europeans and between Europe and the United States. And in the less developed regions, its aim is to expand its influence and erode their ties with the Atlantic nations.

2. The widening challenges of international affairs

Over the last decade, technology, decolonization, and many other factors have made international affairs truly global.

The relations of the West with the Soviet bloc have taken on a new dimension. The ferment in Eastern Europe and the Soviet situation offer the Atlantic allies greater scope for an affirmative policy to encourage this evolution.

Asia, Africa, and Latin America are potential and actual sources of instability and rivalry. Cyprus, the Congo, Vietnam, Santo Domingo, Kashmir, Indonesia, and Malaysia are symptoms and examples of the turmoil and disorder which seem sure to plague these less developed regions for many years to come.

The pressure of Communist China poses a separate threat for the West in the Far East and in the wider reaches of the less developed world. It raises difficult questions of how to organize a framework for security in the Far East and to improve the capacity to resist disruption and subversion.
3. Relations among NATO members

Trans-Atlantic. A decade of growth and prosperity unmatched in its history has now restored European self-confidence but has not reduced the disparity in actual power between the European allies and the United States.

This gulf remains very wide for even the largest European states (GNP's from about seven percent to fifteen percent, and military spending from about three percent to nine percent of that of the United States). Despite the success of the Common Market, no European political entity exists which can take decisions or mobilize resources for foreign affairs or defense.

This disparity creates trans-Atlantic tensions.

Intra-European. Within Europe, tensions have also developed. The larger states, while sharing a desire for a greater influence in world affairs, diverge in their concepts of Europe and of Atlantic relations and their priorities. Although they do not differ greatly in size or resources, the nuclear issue has introduced disparities among them. The British and French forces, however limited as deterrents, do serve to distinguish those two countries from the other NATO allies in Europe. Claims of primacy or special roles on this basis inevitably inject elements of friction and rivalry into the relations among the European allies.

II. How Far is Concerted Atlantic Action Necessary and Feasible?

In their aggregate effect, these changes have created a radically new setting for the Atlantic Alliance. The effort to contain the U.S.S.R. (and China) now takes many forms in a vastly extended arena. Even more important, that effort
can be seen as only the negative side of a larger challenge. Its positive aspect is the building of a viable world order to accommodate both the advanced and the less developed regions—a long and arduous task at best.

In this process, the Atlantic nations, with their material and human resources, have the power to influence the outcome greatly—perhaps decisively. The crucial questions are: how far and by what means should they attempt to pursue joint policies? How should they organize relations among themselves?

On these issues the allies are far from unanimity. Indeed the divergencies today are much more basic than earlier differences, and harder to compose or compromise. As fear recedes, some allies feel freer to readjust their priorities, with more concern for parochial interests and greater resistance to subordinating them to wider needs. With confidence revived, allies with a wider outlook may put more stress on their role or standing. Those who see their interests in more limited terms object to extending their involvement.

These differing reactions naturally produce very different assessments of the future of the Alliance. In one view the major tasks facing the Atlantic nations demand wider concerted efforts and cannot be handled adequately by either Europe or the United States alone. The most extreme counterview asserts (1) that the basic interests of Europe and the United States now diverge too far to justify joint action; and (2) that close Atlantic ties are bound to submerge the European allies under an unacceptable U. S. hegemony. These contentions deserve brief analysis in order to clarify the outlook for the Alliance.
1. Specific Interests

Security. The original foundation for the Alliance remains solidly intact: Europe’s security is a vital interest of the United States and ultimately depends on U.S. nuclear power. The doubts about U.S. reliability which were discussed for several years no longer seem to be taken seriously. Both Europe and the U.S. are primarily concerned to create an effective deterrent which will prevent any hostilities. Their disputes on strategy have mainly been about means for assuring this result.

Detente. Any genuine detente depends on resolving the critical issues in Central Europe. This the U.S.S.R. has so far refused even to consider; and its policy is not likely to change until some years of further evolution. The experience of twenty years hardly suggests that this process will be hastened by a U.S.-European split or that the U.S.S.R. would be readier to negotiate with Europe alone. On the contrary, constructive change is most likely to result from maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance while concerted to foster the more hopeful Soviet trends. Such a dual policy of constraint and limited cooperation can easily create friction among allies. Only intimate and continuous joint policy-making will enable the Atlantic nations to combine both courses and to guard against cleavages and distrust among themselves.

Economic. The economic needs of both the advanced countries and the less developed world seem to call for more joint action rather than less. With their economies steadily becoming more closely linked, the Atlantic nations must concert monetary and economic policies, and trade policies as well, for their own
prosperity and well being. And the measures essential to promote growth and stability in Latin America, Africa and Asia—aid, trade, commodity prices, training, technical assistance—all require combined efforts by the advanced Atlantic countries (and Japan).

Peacekeeping. The problems of subversion, disorder and local war in the less-developed areas and Far East are not always seen in the same light by the U.S. and its allies. The cause is less a conflict of interests than differences about priorities and what should be done, and questioning of unilateral U.S. action.

In short, the interests of the Atlantic nations in security or prosperity, in East-West relations, or North-South relations appear to be basically compatible and to require close cooperation for their pursuit.

But the necessity for joint action will not make it easy to achieve. The problems themselves are complicated and offer much room for differences in approach and in judgment. The central issues—the construction of Europe, East-West relations, and development—all call for positive, detailed actions extending over long periods. Hence they require the interested nations to coordinate both major purposes and many specific actions and decisions on varied topics.

2. Roles and Influence

Shared interests may not result in effective cooperation for pursuing them if the allies differ deeply about their respective roles and relative influence in the Alliance. Such discontent is likely to be especially corrosive when the cement of fear has weakened.

The imbalance in resources and influence between the United States and the several European members poses this problem sharply. It often produces resentment and frustration, as discussions of NATO strategy have repeatedly shown.
It must be frankly faced that separate states of Europe can hardly be full partners of the U.S.; in joint efforts the degree of influence is bound to be closely related to the respective contributions. This fact has its negative feedback. Some NATO members, while recognizing their interests outside NATO, for example, are reluctant to become involved where action is so largely in the hands of the United States, which often feels compelled to act on its own.

Such tensions arise as much among the European allies as across the Atlantic. Indeed they may be more divisive in some cases: given the disparity in size and resources, inequality with the United States may be more readily accepted than inequality with another European ally of similar size. The nuclear issue, for example, displays both problems. It reflects partly a European demand for a greater voice on these life-and-death matters; but the non-nuclear allies also object to the inequality inherent in the British and French national forces. Again, on issues of arms control or East-West detente, the German concern lest the pursuit of detente lead to acceptance of the status quo or to discriminatory measures is not primarily a European-U.S. issue; indeed, the United States has been more insistent on equality for Germany than most of its European allies.

Thus the interaction of Atlantic and European structures is inescapable. In the long run, a viable Alliance is intimately bound up with how Europe organizes itself. If the European allies wish a genuine partnership, they could achieve it by European political entity, as the experience of the EEC has already shown in the trade and economic field. But the lesson of the European Community is that Europe will in fact attain effective unity only if its members are willing to forego efforts for primacy or domination and to accept basic equality among themselves.
Only the Europeans can decide that issue. But the interaction with the Alliance suggests one criterion for Atlantic action: the Alliance structure should be designed not to interpose obstacles to the emergence of a European political entity. Concretely, this means that the handling of Alliance problems should not create or perpetuate inequalities among the European members, which will impede such a European entity.

3. Guidelines for action

An ideal structure for the Alliance would (a) provide effective means for devising joint policies on the common tasks; and (b) satisfy the desires of various members as to their roles and influence.

There is no prospect of developing such definitive solutions under existing conditions. While Europe’s structure is unsettled, the Alliance cannot adjust its organization or procedures to satisfy fully either the needs for joint action or the aspirations of some of the European members, or to overcome the existing disparity in power between the European allies and the United States.

The only alternative is to proceed on a partial and interim basis. Even to do that the Alliance will have to resolve two questions:

(a) Should the Alliance limit changes to what will be approved by all members, including the most hesitant or obstructive? Or should those who agree on measures to strengthen NATO institutions or integration go forward over the objection of one or more who may oppose such action? Of course, no decision can bind any opposing member if those who are prepared to act do proceed.

(b) Given the differences in long-term outlook, will members who recognize the need for joint action be willing to proceed with intermediate measures which
leave open future outcomes? If so, some Alliance institutions and practices could be improved without prejudging the ultimate structures which might be adopted for working together in Europe and the Atlantic area as and when the conditions become propitious. (See Section III)

To the extent the Atlantic nations do concert their actions—political, military, and economic—they will, of course, make use of various institutions and agencies besides NATO—such as OECD, the European Community, the International Bank, the Monetary Fund, etc. Since our discussion is concerned with NATO, however, these other agencies will be left aside in what follows.

III. Specific Measures for Reform

The various suggestions for modifying NATO organization or procedures outlined below have in general been limited to measures which could be acted on in the near term. They are put forward primarily as a means for provoking analysis of some of the critical issues regarding structure and operation of NATO, rather than for discussion of their specific details.

A. Integrated System of Defense

Even if the Alliance widens its scope, its first task will continue to be to contain and deter the threat from the massive Soviet military capability. On this the members seem fully in accord. But they differ on what is needed to achieve it.

1. Should NATO dismantle its integrated system of defense?

For some fifteen years, NATO has developed and maintained unified commands, facilities, and activities as the basis for collective defense and
deterrence. Should the integrated NATO structure now be dismantled as no longer needed and the Alliance continue merely as a guarantee?

Most of the NATO allies reject this position. They consider that integrated commands, strategy, and planning are still necessary in order to maintain an effective deterrent against the Soviet threat. While that threat seems relatively quiescent now, it might not remain so if the NATO system were pulled apart. Most seem to agree with the Secretary General --

that, under modern conditions, you cannot have an effective military Alliance without some kind of organization in peacetime. The material and strategic problems involved are too big. You cannot devise a nuclear strategy, an early warning system, or a pipeline network, over night. If there are no allied troops in Germany or elsewhere in Europe in peacetime, the credibility of the deterrence is greatly diminished. On the other hand, if allied troops are stationed on European soil, there must be some sort of organization for command and communications.

2. Should NATO create an integrated strategic planning staff?

Various proposals have urged that NATO should have a focal point for defense planning where (i) political and military aspects can be integrated, and (ii) members of the Alliance can assert their views.

This could take the form of a NATO staff, headed by a man of high standing and ability, to perform for the Alliance functions analogous to those of a national ministry of defense. The small staff would be composed of professional officers and civilians qualified to analyze strategy, forces, weapons systems, resources, etc.
This "NATO Defense Minister" could work directly with foreign and defense ministries in developing strategy, forces, logistics, etc. By acting as a spokesman for the common interest, he should help bridge the existing gap between European members and the United States.

More specifically his functions could include: (a) recommending to the Ministerial Council, in the light of expert advice from NATO commanders, defense staffs of NATO members, and his own staff, strategy and force goals for the Alliance; (b) negotiating with national governments to carry out these programs, as approved by the Ministerial Council; and (c) performing other functions regarding logistics, weapons systems, etc., related to the defense planning of the Alliance.

The existing NATO military structure could then be revised (a) to abolish the Standing Group or designate its members as military advisors to the NATO defense minister, making its staff the nucleus of the defense planning staff; and (b) attaching members of the Military Committee to the Council permanent delegations as military advisors to the Permanent Representatives.

3. Should NATO create a larger integrated ground force?

It has been suggested that the Alliance might usefully build up an integrated force which could be available for special tasks and could serve as a mobile reserve to re-enforce the center. It would be of special value (a) as NATO strategy comes to place more stress on ability to deter and resist limited threats below general war; and (b) if NATO members accept greater obligations for peace keeping outside the NATO area.
This might be done by starting from scratch or by developing the existing ACE (Allied Command Europe) mobile ground force, which is now largely a token allied force for showing the NATO flag at the flanks. Such a force would be under a single commander and integrated as far down as feasible. It should have a single logistic and signal system and every effort should be made to standardize its equipment. It might ultimately need to be three or four divisions in order to play the suggested role.

The creation of such a force might test the feasibility of wider integration of NATO ground forces, with unified logistics and standard equipment.

B. Improved Methods for Concerting Policy and Action

1. A variety of measures have been suggested to improve the concerting of action among the allies. These include:

   (a) Foreign ministers or their deputies might meet every two months. These occasions would allow restricted groups of ministers to meet on specific topics for more intimate exchanges;

   (b) Policy-making officials and experts from capitals should meet at regular intervals to develop courses of joint action and to prepare topics for ministerial discussion;

   (c) To tie the Permanent Representatives more closely into policy-making, they should regularly return to capitals for consultation;

   (d) A group of three to five senior advisors, who would be independent of governments, should be appointed as a standing group to appraise the situation of the Alliance and from time to time make reports and proposals, which would go on the agenda of the Council.
(e) The Alliance might appoint a minister for political affairs who
would be charged solely with promoting political consultation among the members.

2. Common to these proposals are three principles based on experience with
NATO and other agencies:

(a) Those consulting should as often as feasible be officials directly
involved in policy-making in their governments. They should be more expert and
better able to inject any joint conclusions into the policy-making at home;

(b) The number consulting should be kept small and should be
restricted to those who are prepared to act. Normally this would include the larger
members with others added for specific matters;

(c) Finding common ground and devising joint policies is often
facilitated by having a disinterested person or group who can serve as spokesman
for the common interest...

3. Existing NATO procedures do not sufficiently reflect these principles.
The Permanent Council is suitable for exchange of information, but poorly adapted
to joint policy-making on complex or sensitive issues.

The Permanent Representatives cannot be expert or intimately informed
on many of the problems and may not be in a position to influence policy-making
in their government. A meeting of all fifteen members of NATO will certainly
be too diffuse for the uninhibited analysis and discussion essential for effective
planning of joint policy. Indeed, on many issues, especially those beyond the
NATO area, half of the NATO members are not prepared to devote resources
or to assume obligations.
4. NATO has, of course, used restricted meetings informally and ad hoc. But a program which formalized and expanded this practice would be a break with NATO custom which could raise serious objections from some members. To make the practice more acceptable, such groups (a) could include the NATO Secretary General or a rotating member to protect the interests of those not attending; and (b) could keep the Council informed of any major decisions.

5. Certain fields may require more than can be met even by the expanded consultation discussed above. Thus, the issues involving Central Europe and the Soviet Union--German unity, arms control, commercial relations, etc--can severely strain Atlantic solidarity. The ability to conduct a flexible policy and take initiatives will depend on the mutual confidence of the key NATO countries and especially of the Federal Republic. That may require continuous participation in developing such policies and proposals.

One solution for this type of issue would be a restricted working group (perhaps in Washington) similar to the Ambassadorial group which worked on Berlin.

6. Over time, the practical effect of these various measures might ultimately be to divide the NATO members into two classes: (a) those who normally concerted on a wide range of policies, which would surely come to include the members with the resources and interest to play an active role; and (b) those other members, who did not but who would continue to benefit from the protection of the Alliance.

In essence, such a development would distinguish two functions of the Alliance: (a) as a regional security system; and (b) as an instrument for conducting a concerted foreign policy.

Would this strengthen the Alliance? Would the members be prepared to accept it?
C. How Should the Alliance Handle Nuclear Sharing?

1. For a variety of reasons, the issues relating to control of nuclear weapons have become critical for the solidarity of the Alliance:

   (a) The strategic and tactical nuclear weapons which support NATO strategy are primarily under United States control, directly or through double key systems;

   (b) British and French claims for special status or greater influence based on their national nuclear forces have been a divisive factor within the Alliance;

   (c) The extreme dangers from any accidental use, plus the doctrine of flexible response, have increased the U.S. insistence on the need for centralized control of such weapons;

   (d) Concern about the possible consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons has steadily grown in step with their destructive power;

   (e) In the discussions about a possible treaty on non-proliferation, the Soviets have insisted on terms which would bar any kind of collective force or similar nuclear sharing system in which the Federal Republic would participate.

2. The result of these various factors is to create serious strains within the Alliance as between the European allies and the United States and between nuclear and non-nuclear European allies.

3. In recent years, efforts have been made to broaden the knowledge and understanding of nuclear planning and related matters by various measures such as appointing a special SHAPE deputy for nuclear matters, by designating NATO liaison officers at SAC headquarters, and by creating the Special Committee. But the issue has not yet been adequately resolved.
4. The situation creates real dilemmas for NATO. In essence, a solution should meet the following criteria:

   (a) It should curtail the spread of nuclear weapons in national hands, by assuring no additional force under national control and, if possible, by absorbing one or both of the existing national forces;

   (b) It should give the European members of NATO a greater voice in nuclear strategy, guidelines, planning and use, and related matters such as arms control;

   (c) It should satisfy the legitimate desire of the non-nuclear powers for relative equality among the European NATO members;

   (d) It should be capable of developing or adjusting as the political situation in Europe evolves, so that a political Europe, if and when it emerges, could assume a more equal role as a partner of the United States.

5. The main alternatives which have been proposed for nuclear sharing are briefly as follows:

   (a) A Special Committee, with participation in planning, etc. for all nuclear forces available to NATO defense without any sharing of ownership or control over use;

   (b) A collective Atlantic force which would be jointly owned, managed and controlled and might or might not absorb one of the existing national forces and whose board could also participate in planning for all NATO nuclear forces;
(c) A Control Committee, which would control the use of some segments of existing nuclear forces (to remain under present ownership, manning and management), and which could also participate in planning for all NATO nuclear forces;

(d) A European force, which would be jointly owned, operated and controlled by a European authority, but “coordinated” with U.S. forces and planning.

6. No proposed solution will fully satisfy all the above criteria under existing conditions. Hence any choice must be based on comparing benefits and disadvantages of various alternatives. In doing so, the allies will also have to consider the relation of any solution to efforts for a non-proliferation treaty. In particular, it will be essential to weigh the value of Soviet agreement to such a treaty in comparison with its impact on Atlantic cohesion, especially if its effect is to freeze existing inequalities.

IV. Conclusion

If the great task for this period is the building of a viable world order, the Atlantic nations can contribute in two ways: (1) by organizing their own relations as a stable component of such an order; and (2) by utilizing their resources and influence to encourage orderly development of bases for stability and cooperation, and to deter and prevent disruptive actions and coerced change.

Both processes will require patient efforts over a long period. To make this possible, the Atlantic nations will have to hammer out a common framework which will give direction to their activities. Consensus on such a broad conception can only emerge from extended discussion and debate not only among governments but also among influential private groups.
Measures such as those outlined could assist the Atlantic nations to improve their cohesion and capacity for joint action during this pivotal stage of transition. Hopefully, they could also nourish the attitudes which would advance both European unity and Atlantic partnership.

In the present confusion, the immediate results are likely to be modest. It will take time to expand horizons of interest and readiness to share and assume responsibilities and burdens. The efforts involved must be partly viewed as an investment to attain future dividends in Atlantic relations and international order.
To the American Participants in the 1966 Bilderberg Meeting

From: Joseph E. Johnson

I enclose herewith a copy of a study, entitled The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues, prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. I think you will find this of interest in connection with the first agenda item for the meeting.

I shall also send you within the next few days, copies of two reports of the Atlantic Council’s Committee on NATO, which are relevant to our agenda.

Enclosure
FOREWORD

At the Atlantic Treaty Association Assembly in Ottawa in 1964 it was agreed that the 1965 session of the Assembly to be held in Rome this September would give priority consideration to "The Future of the Atlantic Alliance." Some weeks ago the Atlantic Council of the United States appointed a Committee to study the problems involved, beginning with the question "Are changes in the North Atlantic Treaty necessary or desirable?" The members of the Committee are: W. Randolph Burgess, Chairman, Theodore C. Achilles, Admiral Robert L. Dennison, General Alfred M. Gruenther, Livingston Hartley, John Hickerson, Dr. Robert Jordan, Livingston T. Merchant, Garrison Norton, General Cortlandt v. R. Schuyler, Gerard Smith, Charles M. Spofford, and Arnold O. Wolfers.

The first report of the Committee was submitted to the Board of Directors of the Council on June 30, 1965. The Council authorized its publication as a Council statement, including publication in the next issue of The Atlantic Community Quarterly.

Further reports are anticipated.

July 26, 1965
ARE CHANGES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE?

A Report Prepared by the Committee on NATO of the Atlantic Council of the United States

The provisions of the Treaty, which entered into force on August 24, 1949, concerning modification and withdrawal are as follows:

Article 12

"After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Article 13

"After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation."

The Treaty is based on the simple commitment in Article 5 of each Party to regard an armed attack on any other Party as an attack on itself and to take "forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Apart from this specific commitment, the Treaty was deliberately kept as simple as possible in order to provide for collective defense in a framework sufficiently flexible to be adapted to any future needs which might arise.

Incidentally, the provisions of Article 13 represent a compromise between the desires of the French Government, which pressed hard for a duration of 50 years, and the U.S. Government, which was reluctant to enter into such a novel and far-reaching commitment for more than 10 years.
The integration of command, forces and infrastructure which has taken place under the Treaty, Articles 9 and 3, has been in response to the increasing need for such integration to provide effective defense in today's world. Those articles read:

**Article 9**

"The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5."

**Article 3**

"In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

Despite the clear language of Article 13, there is a widespread mis impression that the Treaty expires, or must be renewed, or must be modified, in 1969. This impression obviously has no legal basis. From the political point of view, however, it is necessary to consider the possible direction and extent of the pressure which may be brought to bear between now and 1969 by any Party which might decide to withdraw from the Treaty unless changes it demanded were made. Although formal consideration of changes in the Treaty has been legally possible since August 24, 1959, no nation has ever requested such consideration. Any change would require unanimous agreement by the 15 Parties and unanimous ratification by their respective constitutional processes.

There has as yet been no official notification from any Party specifying its desires concerning modification of the organization developed under the Treaty or consideration of withdrawal from the organization.

Despite whatever real or apparent improvement has taken place in East-West relations there is as yet far too little evidence of any
change in the basic Communist objective of world-wide Communist domination to justify the West in letting down its guard. The threat in Europe, even though it might decline, cannot diminish the need for unified defense by the United States and its allies. Whatever the level of defense necessary in the future, it will need to be more, rather than less, integrated.

From the military point of view the Treaty as it stands is as good today as when it was signed. The recognition in Article 5 that an armed attack on any one Party shall be considered an attack on each is no less pertinent today than it was in 1949. The adequacy of its simple provisions to provide flexibility in meeting changing needs has been proved by 15 years of experience.

However, unified defense today far transcends the purely military field. It depends essentially on common political will. Basically it requires the development of greater unity in all fields.

During the Senate debate on ratification of the Treaty in 1949 Senator Vandenberg declared: "Unless the Treaty becomes far more than a military alliance it will be at the mercy of the first plausible Soviet peace offensive." The prophetic truth of his words has been demonstrated by the discord among the allies which has increased every time there was an apparent slight reduction in East-West tensions. The long range future of the Atlantic alliance depends upon developing positive Atlantic unity of the type which would be in the common interest even if the Communist threat had never existed.

Conclusions

In the opinion of the Atlantic Council of the United States:

1. The NATO Treaty provides a firm commitment and flexible framework for collective defense as valuable and necessary today as it was in 1949. No government has proposed any changes, although under the Treaty changes could be considered at any time after the first ten years. One means of removing possible continuing uncertainties after 1969, would be the negotiation of a protocol embodying the undertaking of the Parties to extend their commitments under the Treaty for a further period beyond 1969 without the right to withdraw.

2. The Organization under the Treaty can of course be modified at any time by action of the NATO Council. No country has submitted to the Council any proposal for major changes. The United States has always been prepared to consider fully and objectively any
proposals for change. The clear principle is that in the nuclear age, deterrence and defense require, in advance of any emergency, effective peacetime unification of military forces and resources. Any modification of the existing organization should be designed to make such unification more, and not less, effective.

3. We believe the American people give full support to President Johnson's VE Day statement of May 7, 1965: "Let us therefore continue the task we have begun, attentive to counsel but unmoved by any who seek to turn us aside. We will go all together, if we can. But if one of us cannot join in a common venture, it will not stand in the way of the rest." The United States is fully committed to multilateral rather than bilateral arrangements.

4. The effective security and future well-being of the Atlantic Community transcend the military field. They require a maximum of common or harmonized policies and concerted action on major matters of common concern in any part of the world.

5. Institutions are less important than the will to cooperate. If adequate will exists, present institutions will be adequate to achieve our common objectives or can be developed to make them so.
THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
BASIC ISSUES

A STUDY
SUBMITTED BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 181, 89th Cong.)
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1966
OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON, CHAIRMAN

Hearing with Dean Acheson

Wednesday, April 27, 1966, 10:00 a.m.

Today we open public hearings for a frank and impartial stock-taking of the Atlantic Alliance.

Authorized by resolution of the Senate in 1965 and 1966, our Subcommittee has been reviewing the conduct of national security policy, with special reference to the Atlantic Alliance. Our approach is nonpartisan and professional. During the first session of the 89th Congress, the Subcommittee took testimony which laid the foundation for the current phase of the inquiry. In February we issued a special study entitled The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues which examines key problems on which testimony will be taken.

Our inquiry has three major purposes:

One: It is time to get Atlantic area problems high on the agenda of Congress and the Executive Branch and give them the priority they deserve.

Two: The North Atlantic Alliance has worked -- remarkably well. It is the most successful peacetime alliance of modern times. But the world has been changing, and there may be some new and better ways to use the Alliance and to improve its effectiveness, and this committee wants to help find them.

Three: There is an important educational job to be done. The American people need to catch up with what has been going on in the North Atlantic area and understand the continuing dangers and the opportunities in the most decisive region for the future of this nation and of individual liberty.

We are greatly privileged to have with us today, the Honorable Dean Acheson. Distinguished servant of the Nation, prime mover in the reconstruction of Europe and architect of the North Atlantic Alliance, his strength of will, bold mind and independent judgment have placed the free world forever in his debt.

We welcome your statement, Mr. Acheson.
For Release 10:00 A.M., Wednesday, April 27, 1966

Statement of
the Honorable Dean Acheson
on the North Atlantic Alliance
before the
Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations
Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman

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Mr. Chairman, may I begin with a fable.

A town suffered a number of disastrous fires. The citizens organized
a volunteer fire department, bought some modern fire-fighting equipment, trained
some vigorous fellows as firemen, and carried on a thorough fire-prevention
campaign. For several years the town had no serious fires at all, only an
occasional grass fire, which was quickly put out.

The town prospered. Memories of its past misfortunes dimmed. Some
people began to wonder if, after all, the danger of fire had not been
exaggerated, and to question whether the trouble and expense of a fire department
were necessary. In time, a volunteer resigned, to be followed by others until
only a small crew remained. The fire-prevention program lagged; trash
accumulated in the backyards and alleys. One day a careless smoker tossed
away a cigarette, and in the resulting fire much of the town was destroyed.

Mr. Chairman, NATO is the fire department of the Atlantic Alliance.
One of the volunteers is resigning. We have not had a fire recently, and
unfortunately there is nothing like a fire to make short-sighted mortals
appreciate their fire department. The debris of World War II has not been
fully cleared away, and is lying there, a fire hazard, capable of being ignited
by a spark.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed 17 years ago this month. It was
signed to fill a need which not even all the resources of the Marshall Plan
could meet. This was the need for security in Europe and the essential sense
of confidence without which economic growth and political stability could not
occur. Official French statements of those days, pleading for an American
presence in Europe, sound a bit odd today. "We know," said Henri Queuille,
the French Prime Minister, "that once Western Europe was occupied America would again come to our aid... But the next time you would probably be liberating a corpse." All of Europe did not possess the power to hold in check the power of Soviet Russia, aimed, as it was, at obtaining hegemony in Europe. The events of 1946, 1947, and 1948 left no doubt of that. So the power of North America was added and combined in a commonly directed purpose.

What has happened in the next few years is a success story. A strong Atlantic defense has been organized. Western Europe has not only recovered economically but has also gone on to achieve new levels of prosperity. Old divisions were being overcome; old hostilities were giving way to cooperation. In combination, all these things have induced feelings of comfort and security, and in this relaxed state, some have begun to wonder whether a time had not come to shuck the burdens of alliance and to rearrange things in the grand manner.

The Russians have known all along what they wanted -- to consolidate their sphere on a line drawn as far to the West as possible and to keep the West divided and off balance. But more importantly, they have known what they did not want. It takes two to tangle and they have not wanted to tangle with NATO. They have been standing still because, whenever they tested the will and determination of the Alliance, they did not find these qualities wanting. Russian moderation is better explained by this change of scene than by a loss of ambition.

Circumstances, therefore, changed in many ways, mostly for the better, and helped to moderate Soviet policy. But the exposed position of Europe, the relative strength within Europe of the Western European states and the
Soviet Union, and the ambitions of the latter have not changed. Germany is still divided; Berlin remains an island; important boundaries have not been finally decided; the governments of the countries liberated and occupied by Russian forces two decades ago exist not by the consent of the governed but despite its absence; powerful armed forces face each other across frontiers which are a constant temptation to anyone with incendiary tendencies; and from evidence at hand, it is clear that the Russians do not accept the notion that military technology has reached a plateau and that the present military balance is fixed for the future. They are gambling enormous resources on the chance that they may score a decisive advance in weapons systems.

If the Western coalition now weakens and instead of a strong, united front we find a divided one, with Western Europe itself split into a number of small to medium-sized and weak states, surely the result will be a Russia not more, but less cooperative.

Now, apparently, the wheel of circumstance is turning again. Not much is to be gained, I think, from rehashing the past. If things had been different, they might have been very different. But they weren't, and there is blame, more than enough, for all to share.

Marshal Foch used to tell classes at the French War College: "Let us dispense with all automatic solutions. Let us first have general principles, then let us apply these principles to the case at hand, which is always new and fresh, and let us keep asking ourselves the question that the mind tends to neglect: 'What is the objective?'

Our first principle is that our hopes for peace must be firmly based on allied unity of purpose, unity in action, and strength in being. All of
us were ready to cooperate with the Russians after the war. But they were not ready to cooperate with us. Having lived through the 30's and having learned that war was the price democracies paid for weakness, we recognized that only the strong can be free. President Truman, General Marshall, Arthur Vandenberg, Bob Lovett, Will Clayton, and many reflective and far-sighted Europeans did not have to waste time discussing whether strength was to be preferred to weakness.

In dealing with Moscow they knew that the best and, indeed, the only way was to create a strong position which had to be recognized and dealt with. They found the Russians hardheaded, unsentimental, and undogmatist in action; they recognized facts.

Priority was therefore given to Europe's economic recovery and to the building of its defenses. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France stationed forces in Germany. The three gave their full support to the German leaders who created the Federal Republic. Together they brought it as a respected and equal member into the Alliance, and into a Europe moving increasingly toward unity in defense and civil life. An integrated international command structure was established under General Eisenhower as the supreme commander of allied forces in Europe. Together we worked out, in consultation and cooperation, a military strategy for Europe's defense, trained and equipped our forces, and readied them for an emergency.

All this was based on the sound doctrine that unless there is power to stop the use of power, the Russians need only threaten its use to advance their interests. But with NATO in existence and prepared, Western Europe
would not have to knuckle under to any demands directed at it by the Kremlin. No one then thought of all this as subordinating any ally to any other. It was not, and is not, subordination but the prudent combining of our resources in a common plan and under single direction which makes for deterrence in an age when military science has reduced reaction time to a matter of minutes.

The need for a strong Western coalition has not diminished. It remains fundamental to the achievement of the positive goals which a united, prosperous and strong center to the free world can accomplish.

The second principle follows from the first: because it is better to be united than divided, the foundation of our policy with respect to France should be, as well said in the study released by your committee, the principle of the "empty chair". We should do nothing on our part to prolong France's absence; we should keep her place ready and work for her return. But first we should understand clearly the full implication of French policy.

The present attack from Paris is no mere criticism of the plans for the defense of Europe, the united command which has been set up near Versailles to take over in the event of conflict (and not before), and the forces in being which all the allies have stationned in Europe, including in France, to respond to that command. The attack is upon the whole idea of having such a plan and forces to carry it out, upon the idea of American presence in Europe, but, even more, upon the great European effort toward unity of the past fifteen years. By this we mean the creation of European institutions with powers which give scope and opportunity for growth to the economy of Europe. A more unified Europe strongly linked with North America could be a central powerhouse for the free world made up of five hundred
million skilled people producing a thousand billion dollars of goods and services annually. The potentialities of such a society are enormous.

The banner of nationalism in Europe has been raised again. It has been stated frankly in Paris that France because of her past glories and present nuclear weapons is the natural leader of Europe. Great Britain, as an island, is said not to have a European point of view, but might be acceptable if and when she purges herself from suspicion of sympathy with American notions. Germany, while divided, is not entitled to be regarded as an equal European state, and can only be united on some vague but neutralistic terms.

It is against this background that the assault on NATO must be viewed. So viewed, it is a plain warning of dubiety -- a warning that France disapproves of NATO policy, finds its organization abhorrent, and wants it out of the country. Its members are offered the solace that if they are attacked and have not brought their troubles on themselves, France will come to their aid.

As a result, the NATO commands and the United States headquarters for U. S. forces in Europe, both invited and even urged to locate in France, are told to move out within a year. No landlord serving notice of termination of a lease upon an undesirable tenant could have been more brusque. French officers serving in the NATO commands and French troops in Germany and elsewhere will be withdrawn from NATO connection on July 1, 1966. American facilities in France and American troops on them are asked to be removed within a year.
However, notice has not been given of withdrawal from the treaty. France will be found fighting by her allies if one of them is subjected to "unprovoked attack", reserving the prerogative of deciding when an attack is unprovoked. If, for instance, a stand taken by the allies against demands of the Soviet Union is disapproved in France, would one be surprised if France regarded Soviet threat of force as "provoked"? In short, the recent development of French policy has not drawn a picture of France as a dependable or an effective ally.

Our third principle is simply that power exists to serve a purpose. From the outset our purpose has been not to freeze the status quo in Europe but to create an environment in which a flexible and imaginative diplomacy could work to create a more stable and acceptable situation.

If the Western allies have made a mistake in these past years, it has been in failing to set their sights high enough. They have been right in not desiring strength for itself. It is desirable for the prospects it opens up, the most exalted of which is to create an environment in which free societies may exist and prosper.

We have already noted the vast contribution to creating this environment which could be made if Western Europe and North America jointly pursued common ends. A vital part in this development could be the evolution of a European society with strength and vision worthy of the common interests of 300 million persons with an annual productive capacity of $450 billion. Here would be the essentials of power, a combination of skilled people, natural
resources, advanced technology and the will to act. A Europe of small and medium-sized nationalities, divided by jealousies and selfish rivalries, can never play a part worthy of Europe's potentialities.

In 1950 under French leadership six of the European nations began the task of combining their resources within the framework of a new European community. The goal sought was more than economic rationalization. The community was bound together by strong and developing political ties as well. Due to a change in French governmental attitude this process is for the moment checked, but the movement has such broad support in Europe that some time in the future the process will be resumed.

The immediate political purpose of such a vigorous partner in the Atlantic Alliance would be to play its full part in creating an atmosphere favorable to solution of the problems which create instability in Central Europe, the unresolved problems of the late war. These are the division of Germany and the gap between the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe. Here, quite as much as in the effort for military security, the path to success lies in joint efforts to further a common interest. Individual and unconditional attempts to advance the special interest of one state over others as the agent of a détente can only lead to division and suspicion.

These are the prospects, Mr. Chairman, that could flow from the maintenance of a strong, cooperating, forward-looking Western coalition. They offer the soundest hope and belief that one day there may come a European settlement with the Soviet Union which would make this battle-scarred planet a better place.
In all of this, the United States has a special responsibility deriving from its power and substance. We are involved in many important areas of the world, but none more crucial than the North Atlantic area. Europe and our relations with Europe are central to the whole problem of the survival and the success of free societies.